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NOTES
WHEN DOES STOPPAGE BREAK THE CONTINUITY OF AN INTER-
STATE SHIPMENT?--Constitutional law rather successfully defies
the formulation of clear and unequivocal guiding principles, partic-
ularly when we come to deal with the distinction between interstate
and intrastate commerce. Modem business is. so organized that there
are many breaks and stoppages in the shipment of goods, and 
one
of the most difficult problems is the determination of just when 
in-
terruptions in the shipment so break its legal continuity that the 
char-
acter of the component movements must be separately determined,
on the one hand, and when the whole must be considered. one 
con-
tinuous movement notwithstanding the stoppage on the other. 
When
the statement of a rule is essayed, therefore, it should be examined
carefully in the light of past cases.
In a case in which this was recently done, the Standard Oil Com-
pany maintained storage tanks at Wilmington, North Carolina, 
a sea-
port, to which it shipped from its refineries in other states, on its 
own
ships, all the oil and gasoline intended for consumption in North
Carolina. Ninety per cent. of this oil and gasoline was sold by the
company's own filling stations throughout the state, and the residue
by independent retailers. The adjoining district was supplied by
trucks and the remoter sections by railroad tank cars. It was found
as a fact that the ultimate destinatiod'of each shipload of oil or gaso-
line was not determined until after it had arrived at Wilmington.
The court decided that the rail shipments from Wilmington to points
within the state were subject to intrastate rates.- An interruption 
in
the shipment, to paraphrase the language of the court, necessitated
solely by the peculiar exigencies of the particular type of transporta-
tion selected, will not break the legal continuity of the movement;
but if such interruption be bona fide, and the goods pass into 
the
possession and control of the consignee or owner for purposes of 
his
own business, the legal continuity of the movement is broken and
the character of the shipments subsequent to, and preceding, such 
in-
terruption must be separately determined according to their separate
facts.
Assuming the soundness of this principle, many hitherto trouble-
some cases can be dismissed with a word or two. Some of these
present a clear case of an interruption for purposes of the owner's
business. Thus, where a circus is detrained at intervals in order to
stage performances,
2 or where rough timber is unloaded to be manu-
factured into barrel staves, after which the journey is resumed,
3 the
movements are distinct. Other cases illustrate interruptions which are
clearly incidents of transportation. Shipments must . frequently ibe
'Standard Oil Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 6 Fed. (2d) 912 (D. 
C.,
1925).
'Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 472 (1919).
'Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 249 U. S. 134 (1919).
(390)
NOTES
delayed at a seaport in order to obtain a full cargo,4 to await the ar-
rival of the carrier engaged, or merely for the purpose of transfer
from rail to water.s Logs being driven down a stream may be halted
in their course by low water,' or detained by a boom in order to pre-
serve them during excessively high water.' Sheep on a long journey
must be halted to graze and to rest.' Such interruptions are all
incidental and necessary to the transportation, and the court logically
held the legal continuity of the movement unbroken and the entire
journey interstate commerce. That view is of more doubtful pro-
priety where raw cotton is halted after the initial short leg of the
journey and compressed into bales, by the carrier, according to its
usual custom, to insure more convenient handling during the longer
final leg of the journey,' or where coal is weighed, inspected and
billed to its final destination, at scales en route, ten miles distant from
the mines,10 though perhaps both cases may be said to be fairly within
the rule.
A more difficult problem is raised, however, in the application
of this principle to the facts of the instant decision. In cases of this
type, it seems. to be important whether the ultimate destination of the
article is determined before it reaches the point of interruption or
afterwards. If before, then the delay is merely that usually necessi-
tated by the transfer from one. carrier to another, perhaps because
the next carrier is not immediately available, or, if from rail to water,
because a full cargo has not yet been obtained, or simply because of
the time-lost in unloading and reloading. These interruptions are
incidental and necessary to the transportation, and should not break
the legal continuity of the movement. But if the ultimate destination
of the article is determined after it reaches the point of interruption,
then the consignor is obviously using this point as a place of storage
for his goods and the delay is occasioned for purposes of the owner's
business. And there is apparently no sound distinction between cases
where the movement between points in the same state is the initial,
and those where it is the final, leg of the journey. The interruption is
just as much for purposes of the owner's business in the one as in the
other. It is true that the principal case does not fall exactly within
the so,.. '- 2roup. The policy of the consignor seems to have been
to make shipments to the point of interruption in anticipation of the
market demands, and to handle its orders and to make the final bill-
' Louisiana R. R. Comm. v. Texas & Pacific R. R., 229 U. S. 336 (ixgr).
'Texas, etc., R. R. v. Sabine Tram. Co., 227 U. S. 1i1 (x112).
'See Coe v. Errol, IX6 U. S. 517, 525 (1885).
'Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 26o U. S. 366 (z922).
'Kelly v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. i (xgoa).
* McFadden v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 241 Fed. 562 (C. C. A,
1917).
"Phila. & R. R. R. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284 (i919). This case is not
clear in its statement of facts as to whether the scales were owned and oper-
ated by the railroad or by the mining company.
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ings from that point. Occasionally the ultimate destination might
be determined before the goods reached the point of interruption, if
the trend of the market had been accurately foreseen. But such a
condition would be entirely fortuitous, and should not be enough to
alter the classification. Under normal conditions, the interruption
was for purposes of the owner's business.
Considered by itself, therefore, the application of the rule to the
facts of the princiual case seems quite sound and logical in its result.
But it is of interest to compare this decision with those in two related
types of cases which, for the sake of convenience, will be called Case
2 and Case 3. In Case 2, the initial leg of the journey, between
points in the same state, is by rail, and the tariff regulations of the
carrier provide that the goods may be retained indefinitely in the cars
and on the tracks of the railroad company at its terminal, subject
to the order of the shipper, and that, if a further shipment be made
thence to a point outside the state, the-initial movement of the goods
shall be subject to the through, as opposed to the local, freight rate.
In Case 3, raw materials are shipped from the source of supply to a
factory in the same state, there prepared for the -market, and for-
warded thence to a consumer in another state, the tariff regulations
of the carrier providing that the two separate shipments shall be con-
sidered one continuous movement and subject to a through freight
rate. While the United States Supreme Court has apparently not
committed itself absolutely as to Case 3,11 it has held the initial'ship-
'McFadden v. Alabama Great Southern R. R., supra, note 9, was appar-
ently decided on the ground that the stoppage and Qe compression of the cot-
ton into bales were provided for by the tariff regulations of the carrier, but
this could be said to be incidental to the transportation. The cotton also re-
mained in the possession of the carrier. In Central R. R. of N. J. v. United
States, 257 U. S. 247 (1921), the Interstate Commerce Commission had re-
fused a petition to compel a carrier to allow to the petitioner a transit privi-
lege similar to that in Case 3, tiz., timber to be shipped from forest to creosot-
ig plant, there creosoted, and shipped thence to the consumer, the whole to be
considered one continuous movement subject to the through rate. The appeal
was dismissed because the refusal of the carrier to grant the transit privilege
was not shown to be unjustly discriminative under the Commerce Act, but the
validity of such transit privileges seems to have been assumed by the Court
though not specifically passed upon.
Southern Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 498 (igi), seems to present
a curious anomaly. A strip of land along the sea coast was obtained by a
Terminal Company under a state statute and a city ordinance stipulating that
the site be used as an auxiliary to the railroad terminal for transferring freight
from rail to water. A cotton seed exporter, under an agreement with the Ter-
minal Company, reclaimed a bit of this land, then lying waste, built a mill there
for grinding cotton seed into meal, and thereby saved himself not only the ex-
pense of the double handlirg of the seed but also the terminal charges. His
competitors petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel the Ter-
minal Company to collect the usual terminal charges from him, notwithstand-
ing, and the petition was granted. The jurisdiction of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission was questioned in the Supreme Court and the court held
that it had jurisdiction, but went further and said that the shipments of cotton
seed to this seaport from various points in the same state and the shipments of
the cotton meal from the seaport to foreign ports were continuous movements
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ment in Case 2 to be interstate commerce.11 It could be argued of
course in Case 2 that the carrier has not completed its contract until
it transfers the goods to the next carrier, and that the movement is
therefore continuous; but the obvious answer is that the carrier is
not carrying the goods but is storing them, and that such storage is
not incidental to the transportation, but simply for purposes of the
consignor's business. In Case 3, however, it is quite clear that the
movement is continuous only by force of a fiction.' 3
Rightly or wrongly, the court in the priricipal case care-
fully stated the rule so as to exclude Case 2 from its operation," per-
haps overlooking Case 3. Peculiar tariff provisions, such as those
in these two groups of cases, can be explained only in the light of
the development of our railroads, originating solely as ingenious
schemes on the part of the larger railroad companies to take business
away from the smaller competing lines, the through rate being allowed
only when both shipments were made over the same railroad. And
and foreign commerce from start to finish, even though the movement was in-
terrupted at the seaport so that the seed could be ground into meal. And it
should also be noted that there was no tariff provision of a railroad covering the
interruption here as above. It is very difficult -to understand why the court
went so far unnecessarily. It would seem that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission obtained jurisdiction from the fact that the Terminal Company had
obligated itself to use the land for facilities auxiliary to foreign commerce,
and that alone, and that the character of the initial shipment of the cotton
seed to the seaport was wholly irrelevant. Even were the dictum sound and
the two shipments actually one continuous movement in foreign commerce, that
alone would hardly give the Commission jurisdiction,- since the petition was
directed against the Terminal Company and it had nothing to do with the
movement of the goods in question. Apparently the petitioners could prove
their case only by showing that the Terminal Company had obligated itself to
use the land for foreign commerce, and that its agreement with the exporter
was ultra zires. since it resulted in unjust discrimination in violation of the In-
terstate Commerce Act. Nevertheless this case has been cited as an example
of a continuous movement.
" Ohio R. R. Comm. v. Worthington, 205 U. S. 1o (igii), is a good ex-
ample under Case 2. Transportation is interrupted by the ice on the Great
Lakes during the winter season and under the stress of the competition between
the railroads for the freight traffic from the interior to the lake ports facilities
were provided at the lake terminals for storing certain commodities, such as
coal, in the cars and on the track: of the railroad company for indefinite periods
subject to the order of the shipper. Coal was thus shipped from the mines to
a lake port in the same state, halted there indefinitely, and later sent by water to
points outside the state of origin. The Court held the initial movement inter-
state commerce. Cf. Coe v. Errol, supra, note 6, where the owner of the goods
himself, as in the principal case, was the carrier, logs being carried from the
forest to a nearby river, stored in the river until the following spring, and then
driven down the river to a sawmill in another state. The Court held that this
interruption broke the legal continuity of the movement.
"See Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey v. U. S., supra, note 1i, p. 257.
" See statement of the rule, supra. It is to be noted that the court stipu-
lated that "the goods pass into the possession and control of the consignor or
owner." In Case 2, the storage facilities are provided by the carrier, and the
goods remain in its possession, which would exclude that case from the opera-
tion of the rule as stated.
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the decisions holding the two separate and distinct shipments one
continuous movement and the whole interstate commerce seem to
encroach by means of fictions on the power of the several states to
regulate intrastate commerce. Whether such tariff provisions are so
firmly imbedded in our transportation system as to make it impos-
sible to uproot them, or whether the additional control over cornmerce
thereby secured to the federal government is necessary for national
rate adjustments are wholly questions of economics and lie beyond
the scope of this note.
The rule laid down by the court, however, appears to be the
result of an honest and conscientious attempt to digest the past cases
on the subject, very probably having its seed in a scholarly review by
Mr. Chief Justice Taft.1 Whether it will be expressly adopted by
the higher federal courts and how much of the field it can compre-
hend are entirely matters of conjecture; but at first glance it does
seem to clear up a great many troublesome cases with the exceptions,
of course, above noted. Such attempts to formulate governing rules
will go far toward removing the difficulties which, in the past, have
characterized this field of constitutional law.
B.A.B.
EFFECT OF TRAFFIC. SIGNALS ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES AT
STREET INTERSECTION s-When traffic signals are employed to reduce
the confusion of the continual contest between motorist and pedes-
trian, neither party is willing to cooperate in giving this device its
greatest efficiency. Each is convinced that it is legitimate to beat the
"stop" signal if he can, but he is equally certain that the "go" signal
gives him an absolute right of way. "Some automobile drivers
imagine," said the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently, "the
signal gives them a clear right of way against intersecting traffic."
Then the Court proceeds to explode this notion by holding in Gilles
v. Leas I that the driver may nevertheless be liable for any negli-
gence towards pedestrians in the intersecting way. But hardly has
the pedestrian ceased congratulating himself on this victory over an
ancient enemy than comes a pronouncement of his own duty toward
the motorist. In Panitz v. Webb I it was recently held that though
the signal was with the pedestrian, it did not give him an absolute
right of way. The two cases together mark very clearly the limits
of the respective rights and duties of motorist and pedestrian under
modern complex city traffic conditions.
The cases present entirely different situations, in that one deals
with the obligations of the motorist, the other with those of the pe-
destrian. Yet, as will appear, they rest on the same fundamental prin-
ciples. In Gilles v. Leas, a pedestrian had started to cross the street
'Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, supra, note 7, PP. 375-377.
'282 Pa. 318, 127 At. 774 (1925).
'13o Ati. 913 (Md., 1925).
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with the traffic signal with him; when partly across, the semaphore
was turned and intersecting traffic was thus released; the defendant
ran down the pedestrian in the middle of the street on the opposite
crosswalk. It was held that the fact that the traffic signal was with
the defendant could not excuse him. The justice of the decision is
clear, and there would seem to be little room for argument. Indeed,
in the case in which this situation first appeared there was no con-
tention that the signal to proceed exempted the motorist from a duty
of care toward others using the streets. The court merely remarked:
"This attempted regulation, of course, neither placed nor released
legal obligations of the plaintiff or defendant." And in Gilles v.
Lcas, in which the point was contended, the court felt no hesitation
in coming to the same conclusion. With an equal degree of certainty
four other state courts have made the same decision, and with one
exception each decision was reached independently of the cases de-
cided in the sister states.' Indeed, so sure have been the courts that
the answer was clear and the rule not novel, that they have rather ne-
glected to develop to any extent the reason for their holding. Yet
the reason is as clear as the answer. It is all a matter of avoiding
the layman's confusion as to the true function of traffic signals:
An examination of fundamental principles will show that it is
well settled that there is no prior right of way at a crossing. Pedes-
trians and motorists have it in common; and as a result there is a
reciprocal duty of both to use care in crossing. Each has a duty: the
pedestrian, realizing that vehicles have also a right to use the way, to
enter that way with a reasonable degree of caution for his own safety,
and to govern his actions accordingly; the driver, to anticipate the
possible presence of pedestrians and to exercise reasonable care that
he does rot injure them once he is aware of their presence. Appar-
ently, then, each must look out for the other; apparently, also, each
may enter the roadway whenever he pleases provided he would not
be subjecting himself or others unreasonably to bodily danger. Traf-
'Foster v. Parmelee, 179 Ill. App. 21 (1913). The real issue in this case
was whether the evidence sustained a directed verdict. There was no conten-
tion as v. the effect of traffic signals.
'In these cases the facts were the same as in Gilles v. Leas. Melville v.
Rollwage. 171 Ky. 607, 188 S. W. 638 (ig96); Walmer-Roberts v. Hennessey,
191 Iowa 86. 181 N. W. 798 (iqpn), citing Melville v. Rollwage; Riddel v.
Lyon, 124 Wash. 146, 213 Pac. 487 (1923). In Barutio v. Dowling, 186 Wis.
422, 2o2 N. XV. 687 (1925), the facts differed only in that the 
pedestrian was
crossing on the crosswalk immediately in front of the defendant'- automobile,
and not the oppos:te crosswalk. The defendant said he was nu, ;;atching for
pedestrians but only watching the traffic officer. The Court said the driver
must watch not nly the traffic officer but also the condition of the highway in
front of him with respect to pedestrians and other vehicles. Cf. also Croatian
Packing Co. v. Rice, 147 N. E. 288 (Ind., 1925), where on a question of con-
tributory negligence it was held that one caught in traffic by the signal being
turned against him when half way across is bound to act only as a reasonably
prudent man in endeavoring to extricate himself.
I See 5I L. R. A. (N. S.) 99o, roo, on the reciprocal duty of operator of
automobile and pedestrian to use care when approaching a crossing.
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fic signals, it would seem, regulate the time when a man or car may
enter the crossway. It does not follow, however, that they also regu-
late the manner in which the crossway should be used once it is en-
tered. Certainly it is impracticable for the traffic officer to clear the
intersecting ways before allowing opposite traffic to move. But if
traffic is thus to be released before the pedestrian has had an oppor-
tunity to reach a refuge, clearly he must be protected, for no one
would claim that he must scurry to safety as best he can.without the
aid of proper protection frodi some source. As the practical opera-
tion of signals will not afford this protection, it devolves upon the
motorist to supply it. Hence the solution is to hold the motorist, to
a degree of care in using the road which approximates that required
of him when there are no signals.' From the motorist's point of view,
just as "stop" means to come to a standstill, "go" means a way spe-
cially prepared for him. But there is nothing about the signal to pro-
ceed that would lead any one to believe that such is its meaning. A
little thought should show the driver that "go" means merely that he
may proceed as he would have proceeded had there been no signals
at all.
It is well settled that the driver favored, for some reason,' with
the right of way over another vehicle at a street intersection, is not
relieved from the duty to exercise due care to avoid colliding with
a vehicle disregarding that right.
8 This rule could by analogy have
been applied to the situation of Gilles v. Leas. This seems particu-
larly true when it is remembered that the use of traffic signals might
be construed as nothing more than a method of indicating the right
of way. However, the courts do not depend upon the analogy. 
To
do so would involve deciding which party had a superior right of
way, and this was done in only one case,
9 the other courts going only
so far as to say that if there is a superior right of way, it is the pe-
destrian's. The real basis of the decision, then, is that when traffic
is released the usual rules as to the duty to take care apply. Traffic
rules are designed to help, but not to supplant; those who are not
helped, but are caught during the change of signals, are not thereby
to be deprived of their rights.
The duty of the motorist has been'shown. That of the pedes-
trian is now to e considered. Like the motorist, he often seems to
'The degree of care may well be the same. Yet, without so holding, the
cases seem to indicate that to some extent signals may be relied upon and may
be taken into consideration with other evidence in determining whether reason-
able care was used, under the circumstances.
'As, for instance, where a statute or ordinance gives north and 
south
traffic preference over east and west traffic; or where the rule of the road 
is
that the vehicle to the right has the right of way on simultaneous arrival 
at
intersections.
'Erwin v. Traud, go N. J. L. 289, ioo At. 184 (1917). See also notes
in 21 A. L R. 988; 37 A. L R. So9.
' Riddel v. Lyon, supra, note 4.
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imagine that a traffic signal gives him an absolute right of way. The
case of Panit: v. c'bb conclusively shows that it does not. In cross-
ing a street with the signal, the plaintiff was run down by aft automo-
bile which started with the signal and made a right-hand turn into
the street which the plaintiff was crossing. The court charged that
if the jury found that the plaintiff was struck by the defendant's
automobile while she was crossing the street, "when the semaphore
indicated 'go' to the plaintiff, they may find that she had the right
of way over the defendant." The effect of this charge was to give
the plaintiff an absolute right because of the signal. As there was a
sharp conflict whether the plaintiff had not left the sidewalk too late
for the defendant to be aware of her presence and to avoid striking
her even if lie were driving with the utmost care, the court's charge,
if erroneous, was clearly prejudicial. The Court of Appeals held
that it was erroneous. The plaintiff did not have an absolute right
of way; the right is relative; and if she had the right of way at all,
she had it not alone from the direction of the traffic officer, but "from
that in connection with other facts such as that- she had actually ac-
cepted that invitation, and was when approached by the defendant's
automobile, in such a position that the operator thereof should by
the exercise of reasonable care have known of her peril in time to
have avoided striking her."
Thus it would-seem that in this situation the pedestrian has no
more the right of way than has the motorist in Gilles v. Leas. The
signal to go does not give the right of way. It merely releases 
the
prohibition on attempting to assume the right of way which was cre-
ated by the stop signal. And so the pedestrian in going with the
sign must look out for traffic on the street. This was a case of a
motorist also proceeding with the signal. But on the reasoning there
seems to be no doubt that the pedestrian had a duty to look out for
vehicles still in the intersecting way because the signal was changed
before they could get across. And it has been held that even if it is
a driver's duty to stop on a traffic signal, it is still the pedestrian's
duty to use care, so that lie is not warranted in stepping in front of a
moving car when he could see that the driver was not going to stop.
10
Thus it would seem that though the situations of Gilles v. Leas
and Panit: v. e'cbb arise differently, yet they are settled by the same
principle, that the pedestrian and motorist have reciprocal rights and
duties at crossings which do not cease to exist because of the use of
traffic signals. Only an unjustifiable misunderstanding of the true
function of traffic signals would lead anyone to think otherwise. When
it is recalle,l how often these situations must arise, the rarity of the
cases in which the opposite view is seriously urged shows that the
lawyers are clear on the subject; the admirable harmony of the cases,
reached almost without reference to each other, shows that the courts
refuse to be led astray; but even casual observation of the way in
"O'Brien v. Bieling, 267 Pa. 383, 1iO Ad. 89 (1920).
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which motorist and pedestrian act at crossings, apparently on the as-
sumption that traffic signals abolish all mutual obligations, shows that
they still need the lesson set forth in these two cases. H.L.R.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO LAND AFFEcTED
WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST-It is an ancient doctrine of the 
common
law that the statute of limitations does not run against the 
Crown.'
The rule was extended in this country to municipal corporations, 
but
not without a decided conflict of authority. In the majority of 
juris-
dictions, it was held that the rights of the public should not be 
lost
through the laches of public officials, and accordingly, title to 
a street
or a public highway could not be acquired 
by adverse possession.
2
Some courts, however, because of the generally compact nature 
of a
municipality, refused to extend the rule so as to exempt city 
streets
from the limitation of the statute.
3 In some of these states, modifi-
cations have been brought about by legislation,
4 and in a few the law
has been drawn into line with the majority rule by the same method.
On the other hand, a public service corporation is a private cor-
poration, be it railroad or canal company; 6 but 
because of its func-
tions it has been referred to frequently as a quasi-public corporation.'
S'Case of Magdalen College, ii Coke 68 (Eng., i616); ANGEAt., LimiTA-
TioNs, § 34 (6th ed., 1876).
'Ham v. Dadeville, xoo Ala. 199, 14 So. 9 (1893); Larkey v. Los 
An-
geles, 233 Pac. 991 (Cal., 1925); Denver v. Girard. 21 Colo. 
447, 42 Pac. 662
,(895) ; Robins v. McGehee, x7 Ga. 431, 56 S. F. 461 (i9o7); 
El Paso v.
Hoagland, 224 1o. 263, 79 N. F. 658 (906) ; Ulman v. Chas. St. A-. _O, 83
Md. 13o 34 Ad. 366 (1896); N. Y. v. de Peyster, i20 App. Div. 762, 
go,
Y. Supp. 612 (1907); Comm. v. Moorehead, 1I8 Pa. 344, I2 Ad. 424 0 ) ;
Pittsburgh v. R. R., 263 Pa. 294, io6 At. 724 (1919) ; Yates v. Warrenton, 84
Va. 337, 4 S. E. 818 (1888) ; Ralston v. Weston, 46 W. Va. 544, 33 S. 
F. 326
(18w).
"City v. McKibben, 41 Ark. 45 (883); Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa 
283
(1868) ; Cornwall v. R. R-, 87 KY. 72, 7 S. WV. 553 (1888) ; Schneider 
v. De-
troit, 135 Mich. 570, o8 N. W. 258 (19o4); Webster 
v. Lincoln, 56 Neb. 502,
76 N. W. 1o76 (1898).
'Notice must be given to the city; Ky. Gen. Stat. Ann., Art. 5, c. 71, 
2.
Cities of first class exempt from limitation; Ar. Acts z885, 
p. 92; City Y.
GallowaLy, 162 Ark. 329, 258 S. W. 356 (1924). Title may be acquired 
to alley
but not to street; Tex. Rev. Sts. 1911, Art. 5683. See County v. Poth, 
163 S.
W. io5o (Tex. Civ. App, 1914).
'Mich., Acts i9o7, Act 46; Pastorino v. Detroit, 182 Mich. 5, 148 
N. W.
231 (1914). Minn., Laws 1899, c. 65; City v. Gillitt, 
85 Min. 331, 88 N. AV.
987 (19o2). Mo., Rev. St. 1865, p. 746; Columbia v. Bright, 179 Mo. 441, 79
S. W. 151 (19o4).
'Pierce v. Commonwealth. 1c4 Pa. ISo (1883). See Dartmouth College
v. Woodward. 4 Wheat. 518, 668 (U. S., 1819) ; Board of Directors 
v. Hous-
ton, 71-Ill. 318, 322 (i874). 2 KENT, CoMM. §275 (x8a6).
'Attorney-General v. F. & K. R. R., 55 Mich. 15, 2o N. W. 696 (1871);
Stewart v. E. & W. Co.. 17 Minn. 372 (1871). Curiously, Pennsylvania 
ap-
pears to be the only state which has repudiated the use of this term. 
Pierce v.
Commonwealth, supra, note 6.
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In the recent case of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Great Falls
Power Co., ' a canal company, through condemnation proceedings,
became the owner in fee of a strip of land bordering upon the Poto-
mac River. The corporate charter provided that the canal should be-
come -a public highway when. completed, but it was never completed,
the canal operations having been transferred to the opposite bank of
the river. The plaintiff power company brought suit to quiet 
title
to the old canal strip, proved adverse possession for seventy 
years,
and obtained a decree. It was held that the canal strip had been lost
by abandonment and adverse possession and immaterial that the de-
fendant was a public service corporation, and the state a stockholder
therein.
The court considered at length the applicability of the Statute
of Limitations to public highways, but held that in view of the express
provision of the charter of the defendant corporation, the canal strip
never attained the status of a public highway. The question is an
old one, although it cannot be said to be of merely academic interest.
That the right of way of 'such a corporation is impressed with a
public use is generally recognized,' and in some states has been ex-
pressly so declared by constitution or statute.
10 By reason of this
fact, the protection accorded to city streets and other public highways
has been further extended to railroads, in California"
1 and Pennsyl-
vania,1 2 in the absence of any statute. The result is not unusual, for
it is well settled that a grant of land to a railroad by Congress for 
a
right of way cannot be extinguished by adverse possession.' The
grant by Congress is not an absolute fee for all purposes and its con-
ditions are not consistent with a right of an individual to title through
adverse possession. The railroad cannot lose the land by indirection
where it could not convey directly.
14 In several jurisdictions, the
a 129 S. E. 731 (Va-, 1925).
'Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry., 135 U. S. 641 (i89o). The early con-
ception of a railroad was that of an improved highway upon which the 
public
could : heir own cars or motive power. See Western N. Y., etc., Co. 
v.
Buffalo, t.c-, R. R., 193 Pa. 27, 142, 44 Aft. 242, 243 (19o). A canal 
might
well be used at the present day in such a manner.
"Texas v. R. R., 283 Fed. 584 (D. C.. 1922) ; C. & N. R. R. v. Chcago,
140 Ill. 309. 29 N. E. 1109 (1892) ; Kan City, etc., R. 
R. v. L W. R. Co., x6
La. 178. 4o So. 627 (i9o5); Hyde v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 
11o Mo. 272, 19 S. W.
483 (1892); Lucas v. Ry., 67 Neb. 6o3, 93 N. W. 928 
(i9o3).
So. Pac. Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 24o, 64 Pac. 272 (i9ox).
SConwdll v. P. & R. R. R., 240 Pa. 172, 88 Atl. 417 (1I3) ; Holmes v. P.
S. C., 79 Pa. Super. 374 (1924). Where the railroad 
asserts public use to
overcome the bar of the Statute of Limitations it must 
show conditions which
would have enabled it to condemn the land in the first instance, 
or actual public
use. D. L. & W. R. R. v. Tobyhanna, 232 Pa. 76, 81 At. 
132 (1911).
"No. Pac. R. R. v. Smith, 171 U. S. 26o (1898); No. Pac. . R. v. 
Town-
send, i90 U. S. 267 (1902) ; No. Pac. R. I. v. Ely, 197 U. 
S. x (19o4). See
also 12 MICH. L REv. 300 (1914).
"See No. Pac. R. R. v. Townsend, supra, note 13, p. 27 .
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right of way is exempted from limitation by statute.
1 5 There is also
a distinction where the interest of the railroad is only an easement,
the general rule being that occupation of the land by the owner of
the servient estate is presumed permissive.?' But where the railroad
owns the fee, the great weight of authority is opposed to the Penn-
sylvania rule, 7 holding, that title to the right of way may be acquired
by adverse possession," and this applies as well to a canal as to a rail-
road."9
It may be true that railroad officials have a greater financial in-
terest in checking encroacunents on railroad property than is the
case with city authorities and public interests in city streets, so that
the latter should be protected and not the former. Nevertheless, since
several states have exempted the railroads by legislation,"
0 it will be
of interest to note whether this presages a swing over to railroad pro-
tection, just as the tendency has been to relieve municipalities from
the bar of the Statutes of Limitations 21 as to their streets and high-
ways.
P.L.I.
CHANGES IN PROCEDURAL LAW AS Ex POST FACTO LEGISLATION
-The phrase cx post facto law, taken in its literal meaning of a law
passed after the act has been done, is comprehensive enough in its
scope to embrace all retrospective laws, both civil and criminal.' It
has been firmly established, however, that the term as used in the
Constitution is applicable only to legislation punishing as criminal
acts done before it became effective.3 The constitutional inhibition
" Maney v. R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 283, 37 N. E. 164 (1894); Amee v. B. &
A. R R., 212 Mass. 421, 99 N. E. 168 (1912); Powell v. Atchison, 15 Mio.
339, 114 S. W. io67 (19o8) ; Lucas v. Ry., 67 Neb. 603, 97 N. W. 312 (1903) ;
Costello v. G. T. R. Co., 7o N. H. 403, 47 Ad. 265 (x9o) ; Purifoy v. R. R,
108 N. C. 100, 12 S. E. 741 (1891); May v. A. C. L Co., 15' N. C 38,66 S.
F. 310 (19o9); Bacon v. B. R. Co., 83 Vt. 421, -6 Ad. 228 (igo). The Ver-
mont statute is constitutional. Dronin v. B. R. Co., 74 Vt. 343, 52 Ad. 957
(1902).
" U. P. R. R. v. Kindred, 43 Kan. 134, 23 Pac. 112 (1890); Ala. G; S.
R. R. v. McWhorten, 202 Ala. 455, &o So. 839 (1919). Contra: Donahue v.
R. R., 165 I11. 640, 46 N. E. 714 (1897) ; R. R. v. Holton, i0 Ky. 665, 39 S. W.-
27- (1897); Matthcws v. R. R., jio Mich. 27o, 64 N. W. ixi (i896).
Supra, note 12.
Alex. City Co. v. R. R., 182 Ala. 516, 62 So. 745 (1913) ; Northern R. R.
v. Demarest, 94 N. J. L. 68, io8 Ad. 376 (2929); Dulin v. 0. R. R. R., 73 W.
Va. i6o, 8o S. E. 145 (1913). See also 2 VA. L. REv. 599 (1915).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Great Falls Power Co., supra, note 8.
-Supra, note is.
' Supra, notes 4 and 5. Cf. Ralston v. Weston, 46 'V. Va. 544, 33 S. E.
326 (1899).2 2 .STORY, COaMENTARaIS oN Tn CONSTITUTION, (sth ed., Bigelow, x89i)
219.
'Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3, and sec. xo, cl. i.
'Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S, 1798).
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was thus limited in the first decision of the United States Supreme
Court on this subject,' in which Mr. Justice Chase judicially inter-
preted an ex post facto law within the meaning of the Constitution as
follows:
"i. Every law that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was when committed. 3. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater pdnishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed. 4. Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less, or dif-
ferent testimony, than the law required at the time of the com-
mission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."
Although at the time of its enunciation there was some dissent to
the principle thus set forth,
5 that the constitutional provisions govern-
ing cx post facto laws in their scope and purpose were confined to
laws respecting criminal punishments and bore no relation whatever
to retrospective legislation of any other description, and while the
definition has been stated differently and in more liberal terms, the
classification has been consistently adhered to by federal and state
courts alike. r The conflict, where any occurs, is in the application of
these rules to the facts of individual cases.
The intention and purpose of the Constitutional Convention in
prohibiting cx post facto laws being to protect the individual rights
of life and liberty against harsh and oppressive retrospective legis-
lation,8 it would seem to follow that every retrospective penal or
criminal statute is not necessarily ex post facto. Courts are generally
agreed in finding that a statute which clearly increases the punish-
ment prescribed at the time when an act vas done is cx post facto as
to that act; and the authorities are likewise in accord in declaring
that a law is not within the constitutional prohibition where, instead
of creating or aggravating the crime, or adding to the punishment,
or substantially altering the rules of evidence or procedure, it miti-
Ibid.
'Johnson, J., in note to Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters 8cr, 414 (U. S.,
1829, 3d ed., 1883).
'"An cx post facto law is one which, in its operation makes that criminal
or penal, which was not so at the, time the action was performed; or which in-
creases the punishment; or, in short, which, in relation to the offense, or its
conse Juences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." United States
v. Hall, Fed. Cas. No. 15,285, (C. C., 18o9).
'Gibson v. Mississippi, x62 U. S. 565 (1895); Commonwealth v. Lewis,
6 Binn. 266 (Pa., 1814); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518 ( o).
,See Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. i8o, 483 (1915).
'A statute is ex post facto which adds a fine to the punishment by ni-
prisonm,.'nt, imposcd by the law in force when the offense was committed.
State v. McDonald, 2o Minn. 136 0873).
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gates the rigor of the law.
10 Difficult practical problems often arise
in determining whether a particular statutory change does or does
not amount to a mitigation of the rigor of the law."
1
The object of the constitutional provision was to protect substan-
tial personal rights against oppressive retroactive legislation
22 and
not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of proce-
dure which do not affect matters of substance; 1S hence the inhibition
against ex post facto laws does not apply to alterations in details of
procedure,"' which affect only the manner in which a crime may be
proved and do not in any way determine the act done or its effect.
15
Such a change may result in the conviction of a guilty person who
would otherwise remain unpunished, but not in the conviction of a
man before innocent nor in an increase in punishment. Thus laws
changing the number of peremptory challenges allowed the accused
or the prosecution," increasing the class of persons who may testify,"'
providing that one who before must have been indicted as an acces-
sory, but punished as if a principal, may be indicted for the crime
itself,"' or removing the qualifications of witnesses so that a con-
victed felon is a competent witness,' or allowing a wife to testify
against her husband,1 have been held not ex post facto as to offenses
committed before their passage. Changes of this nature affect only
the manner of proving a fact which is already an element of the crime
charged, and so do not alter the degree or lessen the amount of proof
necessary for conviction when the act was done. In such case the
nature of the offense, its constituent elements, the amount of proof
necessary and the subsequent punishment remain the same and are
not altered by the statute.
A procedural change, however, which allows substantially differ-
ent evidence to convict or which operates to deprive the offender of
I Commonwealth v. Kalch, 239 Pa. 533, 87 At. 61 (1913); Commonwealth
v. Mott. 21 Pick. 492 (Mass., 1839); People v. Hayes, 14o N. Y. 484, 35 N. E.
951 (1894).
' Thus a change in the law authorizing a shorter maximum or minimum
imprisonment than that authorized under the former law is one in mitigation;
People v. Hayes, supra, note io; but a statute reducing the maximum and in-
creasing the minimum was held to be ex post facto, although the effect of the
decision was to leave no law by which the defendant could be punished, 
and
he was discharged though found guilty of the offense. Garvey v. People, 
6
Colo. 559, 3 Pac. 9o3 (883).
" See Malloy v. South Carolina, supra, note &
' See Gibson v. Mississippi, supra, note 7, P. 590; Mallett v. North Caro-
lina, 181 U. S. 589, 597 (190).
"Frisby v. United States, 38 D. C. App. 22 (1912).
U I WIGUORE, EVIDENCE, 22 (1904).
" Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 45 (186o).
" Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884).
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 32o, 68 N. E. 346 (1903).
Hopt v. Utah, supra, note 17.
"Webster v. State, 142 Ala. 56, 38 So. ioo (i9o5).
NOTES 403
a defense available under the laws in force at the time 
of the com-
mission of his offense can have no effect on 
acts previously com-
mitted, which must be judged by the laws existing 
when the act was
done, ' for such a change, due to its harsh 
and arbitrary character,
falls within the constitutional prohibition. 
In Kring v. .tssosri, the
defendant entered a plea of guilty of murder 
in the second degree and
sentence was pronounced. Under the law 
of Missouri in force when
the homicide was committed -this was 
an acquittal of the crime of
murder in the first degree. On the prisoner's 
appeal, the sentence
pronounced on his plea of guilty was reversed 
and set aside. After
the homicide but before the plea of guilty 
of murder in the second
degree was entered, the law of Missouri 
was changed, so that by force
of the new provisions if a judgment on 
the plea of guilty be lawfully
set aside, it shall not be held to be an acquittal 
of the higher crime.
The United States Supreme Court held 
the new law to be ex post
facto as to the homicide and therefore of 
no effect. Here a substan-
tial right of the accused was impaired, since 
the new law operated to
deny him a defense available under the 
law when the homicide was
committed.
The question of a procedural change, operating 
retr octiv was
involved in the recent cases of Bea.ell 
v. Ohio a Chtf v.
Ohio." In these cases the law of Ohio, 
at the time the crime of em-
bezzlement, a felony, was committed, pro-ided:
"'When two or more persons are jointly indicted 
for a felony,
on application to the court for that purpose, 
each shall be sep-
arately tried." "
After the act, but prior to the indictment, 
the law was amended to
provide:
"When two or more persons are jointly indicted 
for a felony,
except a capital offense, they shall be 
tried jointly, unless the
Court for good cause shown, on application 
therefor by the pros-
ecuting attorney or one or more of said 
defendants, order that
one or more of said defendants be tried 
separately.""
This amended Act was made applicable 
to offenses committed before
the amendment. The defendants moved 
for separate trials, and upon
both motions being denied, the joint trial 
and conviction of the de-
fendants followed. In an appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court
the constitutional question was raised 
whether this was an ex post
facto law and the Supreme Court held 
that it was not.
= Calder v. Bull, supra, note 3.
1 o7 U. S. 221 (88).
"4S Sup. Ct 68 (192).
"Ibid.
Ohio Gen. Code, § 13,677.
- io Ohio Laws 301.
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In these cases the law in question restored a mode of trial deemed
appropriate at common law, with discretionary power in the court
to direct separate trials. The change was merely one in the mode
of trial which did not alter the nature of the crime or its constituent
elements, or the nature and amount of evidence necessary to prove the
charge nor did it add to the punishment, and since the accused were
denied no substantial personal rights by the statute, retrospective
though it was, the cases seem correctly decided on principle as well
as authority.
C. W. K., Jr.
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS I-; A DEAD BODY-The disposition of
a human body after death usually follows the desires of the deceased
as expressed while living, to be carried out by his relatives or friends.
Although, even in the absence of expressions of such desires, disputes
seldom occur, yet, when the question arises, it is one not easily to be
determined by any tribunal.
At common law there were no property rights in a corpse.1 Thus,
while it was larceny to take the winding sheet from a dead body,
2 it
was not a felony to steal the body itself.' It is doubtful whether a
person could dispose of his own body by will, 4 nor could a corpse be
disposed of for anatomical purposes.5 Not only were there no prop-
erty rights, but there are indications that even the relatives' rights
to the possession of the dead body for the purposes of burial have
not always been adequately protected." Certainly, in the Middle
Ages a corpse could be arrested by a creditor for a debt due from
the deceased, thus preventing proper burial by the relatives,T and the
12 BLACKSTONE, COmmEXT.AUESo 429. Rex v. Lynn, 2 T. R. 733 (Eng.,
37S8); Foster v. Dodd, 8 Best & Smith 842 (Eng., 1867); Griffith v. R. R,
23 S. C. 25 (1884).
'Haynes' Case, 12 Coke 113 (Eng., 1614).
"Reg. v. Handyside, 2 East P. & C. 652 (Eng., 18o3). But the unau-
thorized removal of a corpse was a misdemeanor. Reg. v. Sharpe, 7 Cox C. C.
214 (Eng., 1857).
'In Williams v. Williams, L R_ 2o Ch. D. 659 (Eng., 1882), the opinion
was expressed that a man cannot dispose of his body by will because there is
no property in a dead body. The decision has been criticized in -England; 17
LAW. J. 149 (1882) ; and in this country; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313,
56 At. 878 (i9o4); but was approved in Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 Pac.
i;o (igoo). However, directions in wills for the disposition of the testator's
bcdy have been respected from time immemorial. Frank W. Grinnell, Legal
Rights in the Remains of the Deid. 17 GREEN- BAG 345 (19o5). In one case it
was said that a desire expressed in a will is imperative, and the body must be
disposed of accordingly. Cooney v. English, 86 Misc. 2-92, 148 N. Y. Supp. 285
(1914)-
a o CE.T. L. J. 325 (i88o).
. See 9 SOL J. 3 (1864), for instances of withholding corpses from relatives
for purposes of ransom.
'Supra, note 5.
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practice appears to have existed in this country as late as x8x0
This doctrine, that there could be no property in a dead body, -seems
to have had its origin in a dictum of Lord Coke, where, in asserting
the authority of the Church, he says, "It is to be observed that .in
every sepulchre that hath a monument two things are to be consid-
ered, viz., the monument, and the sepulture or burial of the dead.
The burial of the cadaver, that is caro dato vcrmibus, is nullius ix
bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance . . . " If the doc-
trine rests on Lord Coke's etymology of the word "cadaver," its
correctness is to be doubted, 10 but it is to be observed that it is as-
serted merely that the burial is nullius in bonis, which was legally true
at the time, since the whole matter was cognizable only in the eccles-
iastical courts."'
The common law doctrine- has rarely been adhered to in this
country. It has been recognized that there are certain definite rights
relating to the custody and disposal of the remains of the dead, and
that they are in the nature of property rights. This doctrine, if not
originating in, was at least given definite form in the report of the
referee in the. Case of Widening Beekman Street,'
1 in which one of
the conclusions was that the right to bury a corpse and preserve its
remains is a legal right which the courts will recognize and protect.
The report w-as afterwards adopted by the court, and although it has
been bitterly opposed,13 it has received recognition in many jurisdic-
tions."
Undoubtedly there are certain duties imposed on the living to
care for and to bury the bodies of the deceased.$ It has repeatedly
been said that the rights of the living arise from these obligations,
but this theory has been criticized as fallacious and unnecessarily
'See Mass. Act of 18it, Gen. Laws (1921) C. 27,270, prohibiting the tak-
ing of a dead body on an execution or attachment.
93 INsTrrurus 203 (1797).
'The Widening of Beckman Street, 4 Brad. Surr. So3 (N. Y., 1857).
"Ibid; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 5o N. NV. 238 (1891).
1 Su pra, note 10.
"R. S. Guernsey, in an article, The Ouaiership of a Corpse Before BuiaL,
10 CENT. L. J. 303 (x88o), asserts it to be an obiter opinion, full of errors of
law and fact, and opposed to the long line of decisions which hold that there is
no property in a corpse.
"Larson v. Chase, supra, note ii; Page v. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17 (1883);
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, ,o R. I. 227 (x872).
"It is the duty of the husband to bury the deceased wife, and of the wife
to bury the deceased husband; Jenkins v. Tucker, i I-L Bl. go (Eng., 1788);
Cunningham v. Reardon, 98 Mass. 538 (1868); it is the du'y of a parent to
bury his deceased child; Reg. v. Vann, 2 Den. C. C. 325 (Eng., 1851); and a
duty is imposed on a householder to bury the body of a pauper who has died
under his roof, Reg. v. Stewart, 12 A. & E. 773 (Eng., i84o).
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complex.4 "I seems'that the rights are essentially private," 
resting
rather on thelaw's respect for private feelings, and 
that they do not
need t9 lean upon technical and misleading analogies 
for support. In
this connection, one court has said that the rights 
rest "upon consid-
erations arising partly out of domestic relations, 
the duties and obli-
gations which spring from family relationship 
and the ties of blood;
partly out of the sentiment so universal among 
all civilized nations,
ancient and modern, that the dead should repose 
in some spot where
they will be secure from profanation; partly out 
of what is demanded
by society for the preservation of public health, 
morality and de-
cency, and partly often out of what is required 
by a proper respect
for and observance of the wishes of the departed 
themselves." 1,
It is certain, then, that such exclusive rights 
to a body, as to its
-custody and disposal, exist. This fact would 
seem to tend to the
conclusion that it is property in the most general 
sense of that term,
viz., something over which the law accords one.exclusive 
control,1'
and a few courts have so held.2 Others have 
said that there is a sort
of quasi property in a corpse,
21 but the person having charge of it
cannot be said to be owner, but holds it only as a 
sacred trust for the
benefit of all who may from family or friendship 
have an interest in
it.22 It may be admitted that under ordinary circumstances" a dead
body is not property in the sense of merchandise,'" 
but one cannot
draw from the premise, that there is no such 
property, the conclusion
that there are no enforceable rights. It 
seems, however, that the
whole subject is unnecessarily obscured and 
confused by discussing
the question of whether a corpse is property 
in the ordinary commer-
cial sense. The important fact is that the 
custodian of it has a legal
right to its possession for the purposes of preservation 
and of burial,
and that any interference with that right 
is an actionable wrong.
"Frank W. Grinnell, Legal Rights in the Remains 
of the Dead, supra,
note 4.
'Many of the duties are public ones, the performance 
of which is de-
manded by society.
'Fox v. Gordon, i6 Phila. i85 (Pa., 1883).
0 Larson v. Chase, supra, note ii.
"Miner v. Canadian Pacific R. R., 3 Alberta L. Rep. 
408 (1910);
Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 138 (x858); Larson 
v. Chase, supra, note it.
' Pierce v: Swan Point Cemetery, supra, note 14.
'Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, .sulp n, note 4; Pierce 
v. Swan Point Cemetery,
supra, note 14. See the article by Frank W. Grinnell, 
supra, note 4 for a criti-
cism of this theory.
' See Doodeward v. Spence, 53 So1 J. 464 
(igog), where a two-headed
still-born child, which had been placed in spirits 
by the surgeon who attended
the birth, was recovered by one who purchased 
it on the death of the surgeon.
'Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 136 (1876). 
A corpse cannot be re-
covered by an action of replevin under a statute 
contemplating P sonal goods
and chattels of value. Keyes v. Konkel, ii9 Mich. 550, 
78 N. W.1649 (18) -.
Nor is it property that it can be subjected to 
a lien. 3 Ann. Cas. T33.
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The custodian's rights are definite, but they cannot be said to
be absolute. They must yield when in conflict with the public good,"
or when the demands of justice require such subordination.' Al-
though opinions have been expressed by some courts and a number
of text-writers that the rights are paramount in certain individuals,"
it seems, as pointed out in a recent decision,2s that no such universal
rule can be laid down. The proper custodian should be determined
by a broad inquiry into the circumstances of each case, "an inquiry
having due regard to the interest of the public, the wishes of the de-
cedent, and the rights and feelings of those entitled to be heard by
reason of relationship or association," ' and guided by such rules as
those formulated in the case of Pettigrew v. Pettigrew: "
i. The paramount right is in the surviving husband or widow,
and if the parties were living in. the normal relations of marriage it
will require a very strong case to justify a court in interfering with
the wish of the survivor.
2. If there is no surviving husband or wife, the right is in the
next of kin in the order of their relation to the decedent, modified it
may be by circumstances of special intimacy or association with the
decedent.
3. How far the desires of the decedent should prevail against
those of the surviving husband or wife is an open question, but as
against remoter connections, such wishes especially if strongly-and
recently expressed, should prevail
This doctrine seems to give the best method of approach to a set-
tlement of disputes of such a delicate character, involving as they do.
the demands of society, the feelings and wishes of the living, and
due regard to the desires of the deceased.
J. F. H.
As during the influenza epidemic of txig-i91g.
"G.ay v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. g0, i24 S. W. 63S (z9o8).
"A number of courts and text-writers have held that the paramount right
is in the next of kin: Case of Widening Beckman Street, supra, note to; Reen-
han v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822 (x8go); Lowrie v. Plitt, ix Philo.
303 (1876); Smiley v. Bartlett, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 234 (1892). Mr. Moak in a
note to Re Bettison, 12 Eng. Rep. 656 (Eng., 1874), concludes that upon prin-
ciple in a contest between the widow and the heir, the right to select and con-
trol the place of burial should belong to the heir. An opposing opinion is ex-
pressed by John F. Baker in to ALBANY L J. 70 (1874).
Barder v. Barder, 6 Pa. D. & C. 720 (i925).
Pettigrew v. *Pettigrew, supra, note 4.
Ibid.
